Introduction
Joe Stiglitz has recently been very active in questioning standard approaches to policy making such as the "Washington Consensus"
and thinking about alternatives to it (Stiglitz, April 1998; October 1998) . We think it is fair to say that his critiques have stimulated valuable controversy and debate. Prestigious economists have weighed in on both sides of the debate. The reader will find much discussion of this issue in a few minutes of search on the Internet. Joe's paper (Stiglitz, April 1998) Joe's Prebisch Lecture (Stiglitz, October 1998 ) goes further and not only challenges much of conventional development policy but also proposes rather major modifications. One analytical and potentially econometrically tractable way of thinking about such disputes is to use concepts of scientific model uncertainty.
An intelligent policy maker might operate in the face of scientific model uncertainty by using concepts from econometrics like Bayesian Model Averaging coupled with recent advances in decision theory such as modelling "Knightian Uncertainty". This approach was taken by Brock and Durlauf (2001) in an attempt to constructively critique policy applications of empirical growth analysis and to suggest a modified approach that is still empirically disciplined. The idea is to first objectively represent the amount of scientific uncertainty in what we can learn from empirical exercises when there are levels of uncertainty present such as theory uncertainty and model uncertainty above and beyond the usual sampling uncertainty in parameter estimates for a given model. This "true" amount of uncertainty is typically larger than representations of uncertainty in conventional econometric studies. Second, given levels of uncertainty that must be faced by the policy maker, the policy maker should indulge in "robust" policy making that appropriately makes some attempt to hedge against worst cases as well as maximize the usual estimated net benefit.
In this paper we illustrate how the conceptualization of Knightian Uncertainty can be applied to the classic problem of regulating human impacted ecosystems and how it can lead to a type of precautionary principle. Joe has written extensively in the environmental area. For example, we believe that a version of Joe's pair of classical papers on growth and exhaustible resources (Stiglitz (1974a,b) ) could be extended to include stochastic shocks and model uncertainty about the impact of human activities upon the regenerative power of the ecosystem as well as uncertainty about the elasticity of substitution between ecosystem inputs and human produced inputs into the economic process. In such an extension of Joe's work, one could develop a policy analysis framework under Knightian Uncertainty which could lead to potentially useful conceptions of macrogrowth precautionary principles as well as useful insights into the interaction among uncertainties in different parts of the system.
An example of what this approach might look like is Pizer (1996) , except that we would add uncertainty about the elasticity of substitution between inputs and, especially, nonlinear regeneration dynamics for the ecosystem which allow multiple stable states for appropriate parameter values. In this way
Pizer's Bayesian analysis would allow data to speak to these uncertainties as well as the uncertainties that he models. We believe this kind of analysis would help explain which uncertainties matter the most and how scientific resources should be allocated across attempts to reduce uncertainties. Our current paper makes a very modest start on this challenging project by considering optimal management of a human impacted ecosystem under deterministic nonlinear ecosystem dynamics under Knightian Uncertainty.
The analysis of dynamic environmental systems where the accumulation of pollutants cause environmental damages, such as phosphorus in a lake, greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, or acid deposit in soils, has received extensive attention in the literature of environmental and resource economics. 3 In these environmental problems many agents (e.g. countries, firms, farmers) contribute through their individual actions (e.g. emissions) to the accumulation of the pollutant stock, and the damages caused by the pollutant have global characteristics; that is, they affect all agents involved in the problem. In the analysis of environmental systems with the above characteristics, the natural system is described by linear, in most cases, or nonlinear transition equations describing pollutant accumulation.
Uncertainty has also been introduced into this framework by modeling the natural system through Ito stochastic differential equations and application of the expected utility hypothesis. 4 In this paper we consider an environmental system where many agents contribute to the accumulation of a pollutant with global characteristics. We analyze cooperative and noncooperative solutions under uncertainty which is associated with the process of pollution accumulation. We allow for the presence of nonlinear feedbacks in the natural system which could result in multiple steady state equilibria. The novelty in our approach lies in that:
(i) we seek to explore situations where there is a potential heterogeneity in risk aversion between a regulator, acting as a Stackelberg leader that seeks to implement a cooperative solution, and individual agents that behave in a noncooperative way; and
(ii) we analyze the implications of this heterogeneity for regulation when nonlinear dynamics could steer the dynamic system towards alternative basins of attraction.
Heterogeneity in risk aversion is a possibility that appears once we start considering as a possible way to model uncertainty the ideas of the "least favorable prior" decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeilder, 1989) show that the deviation between the cooperative optimal steady state (OSS) and the noncooperative OSS can be broken down into two components: one which is due to the public bad externality of the global pollutant, while the other is due to the heterogeneity in risk aversion between the regulator and the agents. The second effect can be identified as a precautionary effect. Thus the regulatory instrument should account both for the public bad externality and the uncertainty aversion effect, which implies that under heterogeneity in the type of risk aversion regulation is more stringent. We also show that in the presence of multiple equilibria, market-based instruments such as taxes or tradable permits might have some difficulties in attaining the steady state chosen by the regulator because of hysteresis effects.
Finally we examine regulation when the regulator faces random shocks to the initial values of the regulated system that can move the system to an undesired basin of attraction. We derive the optimal regulation in a framework where the parameters of the e-contamination in Knightian uncertainty are endogenized. Thus, at a second level our paper contributes to the literature by having the e-contamination parameter and the implied worst case outcome derived from the underlying structure of the problem rather than imposed in a somewhat ad hoc matter which has been the most common way of handling Knightian uncertainty of the e-contamination type.
The Cooperative Solution
There are n i ,... 
The pollutant accumulates according to
is a convex-concave function reflecting the nonlinearity associated with feedbacks of the natural system.
The cooperative problem assuming symmetric players is:
Equation (1) can be written as:
into (2), the problem can be rewritten in the MRAP formulation as:
The cooperative OSS is determined by:
The optimality condition is:
Suppose a solution c x to (5) 
This is shown in figure 1 [ Figure 1 ]
If we assume an adjustment mechanism in the neighborhood of the OSS of the form
it is clear that since the slope at any equilibrium point 
that some n exists such that for n n > (7) is negative for all
x. In this case only one globally stable OSS exists. Therefore cooperation of many players acts as a stabilizer and could eliminate multiple equilibria. This is shown in figure 1 where the m C curve drawn for n n m > intersects R only once at F to define a unique OSS.
Suppose that the planner managing the cooperative solution faces Knightian uncertainty with regard to the parameters of the natural system. Assume that the uncertainty for b -that is, uncertainty about the self-cleaning process in a shallow lake where phosphorus accumulates, or about the CO 2 absorption capability of oceans -is of the e-contamination type
where b represents a point mass of unity at b and M represents the entire set of probability measures with support [b-B,b+B].
Following Epstein and Wang (1994, p. 288 
It can be shown by using the envelope theorem in (4) 
The equivalent to optimality condition (5) under Knightian uncertainty is
By comparing (5) to (10) the following result can be stated. Under these conditions regulation that seeks to attain the socially-optimal outcome, as this outcome is determined under uncertainty aversion, should correct not only for the public bad externality which is the standard approach in a global pollution problem, but also for the uncertainty aversion effect. This effect is induced by the fact that while the regulator managing the cooperative solution exhibits first-order risk aversion, the individual players determining the noncooperative solution exhibit second-order risk aversion.
Regulation
Given the discrepancy between the cooperative and the noncooperative OSS, the regulator seeks to implement the cooperative OSS by introducing a regulatory instrument. Assume that the regulator uses a linear tax τ on emissions to implement c x . Then , using the MRAP formulation, the noncooperative OSS under regulation is determined as
The FONC imply that the optimal τ should be chosen so that
The tax impact is determined in the following proposition. suggests that in the presence of hysteresis effects a command-andcontrol regulation that sets a nontransferable limit might be more effective in implementing the desired steady state.
Proposition 2 Let

Regulation under Large Rare Shocks
The above results imply that in the presence of multiple locally stable steady states, regulation design depends on the specific basin of attraction where the system is slaved. Once the regulator knows the basin of attraction of the system, then the regulation discussed in the previous sections applies. The regulator might however be uncertain of the system's basin of attraction. This is because the specific basin of attraction depends on initial conditions which in cases of a natural system could very well be subjected to large rare random shocks which can move them from one basin of attraction to the other. It is clear that optimal regulation should take into account such an event.
Let q denote the probability that a large shock moves the initial value ( ) 0 0 x x = of our system to the high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction. In order to expose the effects of large rare shocks in a clearer way, assume that B=0 in (9) so that there is no uncertainty regarding the natural parameter b of the system. Then the optimal regulation problem for the regulator is to determine an optimal tax
is a solution of (13) and W is defined by (4) .
Proposition 3
For an optimal tax that solves (14), 0
For proof see Appendix.
Thus the regulator will react to an increase in the probability that a random shock might move the system to a "bad" basin of attraction by increasing the optimal tax.
Problem (14) can be interpreted in a way that is very close to the e-contamination formulation of Knightian uncertainty (9) with e q = . In the Knightian formulation (9) the second term has been transformed to reflect the worst case scenario which is the worst possible value that Nature can choose for b. In (14) the worst possible choice of Nature would be to shock the initial condition in such a way that the system moves to the high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction and converges eventually to the high pollutant accumulation steady state n x 3 . Thus (14) can be regarded as an e-contamination formulation of Knightian uncertainty regarding the basin of attraction of the system, with the e-contamination parameter being the probability that Nature would choose the worst possible case. This way we provide a straightforward interpretation of the e-contamination parameter. This parameter can even be endogenized if we take into account that the probability of the system ending in the high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction can be affected by the choice of the optimal tax τ .
Assume that initially the system is in the basin of attraction of the low pollutant accumulation steady state. Let the timing be such that the regulator chooses τ and Nature adds a random shock. The system will jump to the basin of attraction of the high pollutant accumulation steady state if the shock is such that the initial value passes to the right of point J in figure 2, which is the locally unstable equilibrium that separates the two locally stable basins of attraction. However, by setting a tax, the regulator affects the position of this basin-separation point, since increasing that tax reduces the high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction JK. In a situation like this the regulator could have two alternative courses of action. One is to choose a tax so that the probability of a shock moving the system to a high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction is zero. The second is to choose the tax by optimally taking into account the effect of the tax on the basin separation point.
To make the probability of the system being shocked to a high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction zero, the high pollutant accumulation steady state should be eliminated. This means that the tax should be chosen so that curve 1 τ R in figure 2 shifts downward until the point where the intersections at J and K are eliminated. The following proposition defines this tax. 
Proposition 4 Let τ be a tax rate such that
with FONC 
Comparing (15) to (14) and (9) has been endogenized since the probability that Nature will choose the high accumulation basin of attraction depends on the optimal tax choice. In (16) it can be seen that in the FONC the first term reflects the marginal effect of a tax change on the probability that the shock will take the system to the high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction which is ( ) 
Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces a new framework of analysis of environmental regulation issues, using a non-linear representation of the natural system, where there is heterogeneity in risk aversion between regulator and regulatees, the regulator being first-order risk averse (uncertainty averse) facing Knightian uncertainty of the e-contamination type, while the regulatees are second-order risk averse.
We are able to identify a precautionary effect in addition to the public bad externality effect contributing to the deviation between cooperative and noncooperative solutions. The precautionary effect is induced by risk aversion heterogeneity.
The first-order risk averse regulator should choose policy instruments in a way that allows for both the precautionary effect and the public bad effect.
Nonlinearities and multiplicity of basins of attraction reduce the effectiveness of market-based instruments such as taxes or tradable emission permits. Because of an hysteresis effect, the achievement of the cooperative solution could require setting taxes initially below the optimal level and then changing them to move towards their optimal level.
Finally we consider regulation under large rare shocks that could move the system to an undesirable basin of attraction. In this case the regulator can choose taxes optimally by taking into account the effects of the tax choice on the probability that the system will move to an undesirable basin of attraction. In this way we obtain an endogenization of the e-contamination parameter of Knightian uncertainty, which is an advance relative to the ad hoc way in which this parameter has been chosen up to now.
In this paper we examined only one possible combination of risk aversion heterogeneity and game form between the regulator and the regulatees in a nonlinear system, namely the one in which the regulator is first-order risk averse and leads, while the regulatees are second-order risk averse and follow. This seems to be the most appropriate choice for the specific environmental problem. Different types of regulation problems could fit different combinations of risk aversion and game forms. This implies that our methodological approach, by allowing for heterogeneity in risk aversion and nonlinear dynamics, could lead to a more realistic analysis of general classes of regulation under uncertainty. It should be noticed that the endogenization of the e-contamination parameter of Knightian uncertainty can also be used as a general approach for analyzing regulation under rare shocks in nonlinear systems.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the total derivative of (10) with respect to e we obtain ( ) 
The FONC does not change due to the linearity of ( ) 
